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Introduction
The importance of xed-term employment in Germany is constantly increasing. The share of xed-term contracts for new hires increased from around 30 percent in 2000 to about 45 percent in 2010 (IAB, 2011) . Although approximately 50 percent of all xed-term contracts end with transfers into permanent contracts, the proportion of xed-term workers in Germany is constantly increasing. In 2010 more than 9 percent of all employees required to contribute to social security in Germany are employed under a xed-term contract. In 2000 this gure was only about 6 percent (Gundert & Hohendanner, 2011) . The increasing importance of this type of employment raises the question of whether and how it aects rm performance.
Previous research on temporary work and xed-term contracts identies two principle reasons for using this instrument. Firstly, the instrument is used to increase the external exibility of labor input. Hence, severance payments and the like are not necessary, since expiring contracts simply reduce the number of employees through attrition when demand declines. Second, xed-term contracts can be used to screen for productive workers. Thus, by selecting the latter and oering them permanent contracts, the overall quality and productivity of the workforce should increase.
However, within the labor market and management literature, the disadvantages of temporary work are also revealed. Here, it is mainly the demotivating eect that temporary work can have on both, temporary and permanent workers, when this instrument is abused. Moreover, the rm specic human capital of temporary workers is lower than that of permanent workers and rms have little incentive to invest in the training of temporary workers.
Since there are opposing eects of temporary work, its overall eect on rm performance is unclear. Previous literature on this topic is rare. Using sector aggregates, Damiani and Pompei (2010) analyzes the eect of labor protection on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth in 18 European countries between 1995 and 2005. They also control for the eect of growth in temporary employment on TFP, nding a negative and signicant relation. Also using sector data, Auer et al. (2005) analyze the eect of employment tenure on productivity in 13 European countries for the 1992 to 2002 period. Their results show that productivity increases with increasing job tenure, but decreases after thirteen years of job tenure. However, it follows for the case of xed-term employees, that rms with a lower share of xed-term worker should have a higher productivity.
At the micro level, Cappellari et al. (2010) use 13,000 rm level observations of all Italian sectors between 2004 and 2007 in order to analyze the eects of deregulation reforms of apprenticeship and xed-term contract. They nd a small negative, but only weakly signicant, eect of the reforms of xed-term employment on labor productivity and must, therefore, reject their hypothesis that reforms in the legislation of xed-term increase labor productivity. However, this result is in line with the ndings of the two previously mentioned studies. Finally, Kleinknecht et al. (2006) analyze the eect of xed-term employment using 590 Dutch rm observations. They nd no signicant eect of the percentage of personnel on xed-term contracts on sales growth. In order to check the robustness of this nding, they also split the dataset into rms with active R&D and rms without active R&D. Again, in both subgroups no eect of the use of xed-term employment on sales growth was found. Hence, previous empirical results point toward a weakly negative relationship with the exception of Kleinknecht et al. (2006) . This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the eect of xed-term employment on labor productivity for German manufacturing rms. In contrast to the aforementioned studies, we control for the inherent selection problem into using xed-term contracts by means of the inverse Mills ratio, since some rms systematically do not use this instrument. Additionally, we apply dynamic panel data models to soften the assumption of strict exogeneity of explanatory variables.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section discusses related literature and derives the hypothesis. The data are introduced and rst descriptive statistics are discussed in section three. The methods used in this study as well as the empirical strategy are introduced in section four along with the empirical analysis. Section ve provides a concluding discussion.
Theoretical framework
In this section we present theoretical and empirical arguments to explain the relationship between the use of temporary employment and labor productivity. Within the extensive labor market and management literature, we identify three main factors and how they aect labor productivity. The rst one is temporary employment as a tool to adjust the employment to product demand uctuations.
The second one is the screening aspect of temporary employment and the last one argues via rm specic human capital. At the end of this section we discuss how the dierent aspects might jointly aect labor productivity and derive the hypothesis.
Temporary employment and demand uctuations
Theory suggests that one of the reasons why rms use temporary employment is because it allows for the adjustment of labor input when product demand uctuates while avoiding termination costs. One theory, developed by Nunziata and Staolani (2007) , suggests that an increase in the demand for more exible forms of employment is driven by increasing redundancy costs and volatile product demands. This is in line with the model of Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) , which suggests that the demand for temporary employment is driven by uctuations in product demand.
These theoretical considerations are conrmed by the survey of Houseman (2001) on reasons for using temporary employment. In it, the adjustment on demand uctuations is named as the most important reason for using temporary employment. In the empirical part of the study, Houseman (2001) nd a signicant relationship between industry seasonality and the probability for using temporary work. Empirical evidence for the adjustment argument is also found by Vidal and Tigges (2009) . Moreover, using data of establishments in Germany, Hagen (2003) reports that using xed-term contracts increases the adjustment speed of work force to changes in product demand. Because of a higher exibility of using xed-term contracts as a tool to deal with changes in product demand, temporary work should have a positive eect on labor productivity. However, the eect of this instrument is limited because the termination of xed-term workers without paying redundancy costs is only possible when the contract ends.
Temporary employment and screening
Another main aspect of xed-term contracts is the fact that it can be used to screen for new productive workers or to substitute for core workers. According to principal agent theory rms cannot observe the productivity of potential new employees before hiring them. Wang and Weiss (1998) provide a theoretical model in which rms use xed-term contracts to screen new employees for a certain period. After the screening period the more productive employees will get open-ended contracts.
Using xed-term contracts to screen potential new employees increases productivity in two ways. First, during the probation period the employee has an incentive to increase his/her eort in order to get an open-ended contract. This is conrmed by the ndings of Engellandt and Riphahn (2005) . They nd that employees with a xed-term contract have a higher probability to work unpaid overtime compared to employees with open-ended contracts.
Second, oering open-ended contracts only to the most productive xed-term contract employees will increase the productivity in the long run. Empirical evidence for the screening argument is found by Gern et al. (2005) and Addison and Sureld (2009) . The results of Picchio (2008) show that, in Italy, employees with a xed-term contract have a signicant higher probability to have an open-ended after two years than unemployed persons.
For Germany, empirical evidence for the screening argument is reported by Boockmann and Hagen (2008) . Gash (2008) nd empirical evidence for xedterm contracts to be a bridge to an open-ended contract. Moreover, McGinnity et al. (2005) show that xed-term contracts are often used as a tool to screen new employees during the transition from education to work for West Germany. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, Mertens and McGinnity (2004) nd, that about 40 percent of employees with a xed-term contract have an open-ended contract one year later. Overall, empirical evidence for the use of temporary work as a sorting mechanism is given for Germany. However, in the case of Spain, where the labor market is highly segmented between temporary and permanent work, there is no evidence for the screening aspect of xed-term employment (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000) . Thus, the eect also depends on the structure and permeability of the labor market.
As mentioned above, xed-term employees can also be used to substitute core workforce. Yet, this strategy comes with negative eects, since it could lead to decreased motivation of both, xed-term and existing core employees (Vidal & Tigges, 2009 ). Decreasing motivation of employees with xed-term contracts may result from lower job stability (Bergmann & Mertens, 2011) and lower wages (Mertens et al., 2007) compared to employees with permanent contracts. Lower motivation of core workers could be driven by decreasing trust in commitment of the rm (George, 2003) . Less motivation of both types of workers could then result in lower labor productivity (Brown & Sessions, 2005) . This eect directly depends on the share of temporary workers on total work force of a rm. If the share of employees with xed-term contracts is relatively high, employees fear a replacement strategy instead of screening and motivation may decrease (Cuyper et al., 2008) .
Hence, with respect to screening and motivation, the eect of xed-term workers on productivity depends on their share in total work force. On the one hand, a moderate use of xed-term contracts should increase labor productivity due to the screening possibility and its positive motivational aspects. On the other hand, an excessive use could negatively aect labor productivity because motivation of both types of workers decreases.
Temporary employment and human capital
A third aspect of xed-term contracts is the positive link between productivity and rm specic human capital. Investing in rm specic human capital becomes protable in the long run. Hence, if the contract of employees ends after a relative short period, there is little incentive for rms to invest in the rm specic human capital of these employees. Therefore an increasing share of xed-term contracts on total work force should go in line with decreasing investments in rm specic human capital. Empirical evidence for a negative relationship between temporary work and investing in human capital is reported by Arulampalam et al. (2004) . Also Booth et al. (2002) nd that employees with temporary jobs receive less training than employees with open-ended contracts. Moreover, ndings of Shire et al. (2009) suggest that rms oering further training tend to make use of long term contracts rather than temporary employment. The same is reported by Albert et al. (2005) . They nd that rms, that do not provide vocational training, have higher shares of temporary worker compared to rms oering further training. Their results also show that given that a rm provides on the job training, employees with temporary contracts have a lower probability of receiving training compared to the ones with open-ended contracts. Yet, as shown by Zwick (2006) for the German case, on-the-job training enhances rm productivity. Moreover, employees receiving training are also more satised with their job and, therefore, have a higher job performance (Jones et al., 2009 ). Regarding the relationship of xed-term employment and the incentive to invest in human capital, an increasing share of employees with temporary contracts reduces labor productivity due to lower investments in rm specic human capital.
Temporary employment and labor productivity
Summing up, we nd arguments for a positive as well as for a negative relationship between the share of xed-term workers in a rm and its productivity. First, when using temporary employment as a tool of adjustment on changes in product demand, it should increase labor productivity. However, this strategy is restricted because employees with a xed-term contract can only be laid o without paying redundancy costs when the contract ends. Second, a moderate use of xed-term employment to screen for productive employees should increase labor productivity, while an extensive use in order to replace core workers with temporary ones may reduce labor productivity due to the decreased motivation of both types of employees. Third, an increasing share of xed-term employees should be accompanied with decreasing labor productivity, because the incentive to invest in rm specic human capital is lower compared to permanent employees and human capital and productivity are positively linked.
Combining these arguments, the overall eect of using xed-term contracts on labor productivity depends on the share of xed-term contracts on total work force of an establishment: a moderate use of xed-term contracts should increase labor productivity due to increasing exibility of labor input and the possibility to screen for productive employees, both overcoming the negative eect of lower rm specic human capital; an intensive use should have a negative eect on labor productivity due to less motivation of both types of employees and lower human capital for employees with a xed-term contract, both overcompensating the positive eect of a higher exibility of labor input. Hence, our hypothesis is, that the relationship between the intensity of using xed-term workers and labor productivity is inverse U-shaped.
Data Sample
The study uses IAB Establishment Panel data for the 2004 to 2009 period. The data are gathered and compiled by the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). It is an annual survey covering about 16,000 establishments per year and it is aimed to be representative both for average and for longitudinal analysis (Fischer et al., 2009 ). The questionaire includes questions about sta development, personnel requirements, sales, investment, exports, as well as R&D, innovation and organizational change (Bellmann et al., 2002) . In addition, there are specic questions addressing the dierent forms of employment used by the rm, such as temporary agency work or xed-term employment. Altogether, the dataset contains about 320 variables, which, however, are mostly related to labor market issues.
In order to apply this to panel models, some editing of the data is necessary. One signicant challenge in using the data is that even within individual surveys, questions focus on dierent time horizons. For example, questions regarding the output or the business development refer to the past calendar year. In contrast, most of the questions related to the labor input are from the current calendar year. Moreover, while the questions related to the rms output are yearly data, some of the input related questions, including, for example, those regarding temporary agency workers, are observations on June 30th of each year. Hence, during data preparation, we must ensure that data are correctly assigned to the year that they reect. Further, analysis must adequately address the issues resulting from the combining of date data with annual data.
In order to resolve the time dimension problem, the procedure proposed by the IAB for assembling the waves has been reworked so that the variables of each wave are assigned to the year the information belongs to. Consequently two observations out of subsequent years are needed to create one observation for an establishment. This decreases the number of observations dramatically. Further data cleaning is needed to exclude missing observations. Finally, all observation for non-manufacturing establishments are eliminated as well as all observations before 2004 and after 2008. For the latter there are two reasons: First, including data before 2003 might bias the results due to labor market reforms. Second, with the 2009 wave, we have information regarding output variables for 2008, but not for 2009. The output information are merged with the input data of the wave for 2008 and the remaining information, covering 2009 is incomplete and, therefore, dropped. Furthermore, we only included rms with a minimum of ve employees. Overall data preparation reduces the number of observations from nearly 85,000 to 10,946. Finally, all rms with fewer than three observations are excluded in the latter analysis in order to apply panel data models. This reduces the number of observations to 8,821 from 2,244 manufacturing establishments for the 2004 to 2008 period.
Measurement of variables
The dependent variable in the analysis is the log of labor productivity (Labor-Prod), which is calculated as real sales per capita. The deation is done using sectoral producer price indices of the OECD for Germany. The regressor of interest is the log of the share of xed-term employed on total employees (Share). Here, neither the number of temporary agency workers nor interns are taken into account. The reason is that both numbers are asked for as date data. We know, however, that the job duration of fty percent of all temporary agency workers in client rms is less than 3 month. Interns in Germany work between one and six months. Hence, although we might nd temporary agency workers or interns on the 30th of June, it is highly possible that they have not been in the rms in the beginning of a year and that they will not be there through the end of a year. Simply adding them to the number of employees would therefore cause the analysis to be biased. For the so-constructed variable, we expect the coecients of Share to be signicantly positive if the theoretical remarks of section two hold true. Moreover, since the eect might be non-linear, the variable is also included in the analysis with its squared values (Share2 ) and the respective coecient is expected to be negative.
In addition to these regressors, we include the logarithms of the following control variables: the overall number of employees to capture the size of the rms (Size); the proportion of intermediate inputs on sales (Intermediate) to capture the position of the rms in the value chain; the share of qualied employees on total labor force (Qualied) to catch the human capital intensity of production; the share of woman in the company (Female) as an additional control variable for the employment structure; the share of exports on sales (Export) to take into account the range of business activities of rms; and nally the investments per capita (Investment), which captures investments in ICT capital, production equipment, buildings and the like, as proxy for the capital intensity of production.
Additional control variables in the analysis are the following dummy variables: the age of the companies (Age1-Age5 ) for companies younger than ve years, ve to nine years, ten to fourteen years, fteen to nineteen years, and twenty or more years; a dummy variable that equals one if a company closed a part of the rm within the last year (Closed); a dummy variable if a part of the rm was outsourced (Outsourced); if a spin-o has taken place (Spin); a dummy variable that becomes one if a part of another company was integrated (Integrated); dummy variables if the majority owner is East German (Owned1 ), West German (Owned2 ), a foreigner (Owned3 ), is the state (Owned4 ), has no majority owner (Owned5 ) or if the majority owner is unknown (Owned6 ); dummy variables for each of the sixteen industries in the analysis; as well as sixteen dummy variables for federal states the establishments are located in; six dummy variables for the legal form of the companies (LegalForm1-LegalForm6 ), which are individual enterprise, partnerships, incorporated, capital companies, corporation and others; dummy variables for companies with sectoral collective agreement, company collective agreement and no collective agreement (Tarif1-Tarif3 ); and a dummy variable taking the value of one if a company has a work council (WorkConcil).
[insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here] Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all continuous explanatory variables and for the dependent variable labor productivity, distinguishing between within and between variation and Table 2 contains simple descriptive statistics for the dummy variables. For most variables between variation exceeds within variation. Interestingly for Share the between variation is only a little higher. Hence, the share of xed-term employees changes considerably over time and not just between establishments.
[insert Table 3 and Table 4 about here] Table 3 reveals the regional distribution of observations and Table 4 contains the descriptive statistics of the share of xed-term employment per industry. From Table 3 it can be seen that 4,398 establishments are located in West Germany, while 4,138 are located in East Germany and Berlin is the location of 285 establishments. The mean share is rather low, ranging from 2 to 5 percent in the entire data set. But among those rms that used xed-term employment, the mean ranges from 5.5 to 13 percent. Moreover, the maximum share ranges from 26 to almost 100 percent. Thus, xed-term employment is a signicant input factor and is occasionally heavily used. Finally, since some rms have never used this instrument, the analysis is subject to a selection problem.
Empirical investigation
The analysis of the relationship between the use of xed-term contracts and labor productivity is presented in three steps. First is our estimation strategy.
We follow with our main results, and then, some robustness checks are presented.
Methods and empirical strategy
To control for the potential self-selection into the use of xed-term contracts, the empirical estimation starts with the estimation of a probit selection model. The dependent variable takes the value of one if a company uses xed-term contracts and zero otherwise. Based on the result of the probit model we calculate the inverse Mills ratio. This ratio is used as an additional variable in the regression models to control for the selection eect. For detailed discussion of this approach see Briggs (2004) . To increase identication of the model and to avoid potential multicollinearity between the inverse Mills ratio and the explanatory variables of the regression models we exclude some variables used in the selection model from the regression models in the second stage, as proposed by Puhani (2000) .
To test the hypothesis of an inverse U-shaped relationship between the use of xed-term employment and labor productivity, the following equation is estimated: log(LabP rod it ) = β 1 Share it +β 2 Share2 it +γ k log(x kit )+θ m D mit +δM ills it +v i +u it with i=1,...,N, t=1,...,T, Share=log(1+Share) and Share2=0.5*Share 2 . Share it is the quotient of employees with a xed-term contract and total work force of an establishment. X kit denotes all continuous control variables, D mit indicates all dummy variables and Mills it captures the self-selection into the use of xed-term employment via inverse Mills ratio. Finally v i denotes an establishment specic xed eect and u it is the error term capturing unsystematic inuences of labor productivity.
The estimation strategy is as follows: To get a rst impression of how the use of xed-term contracts and labor productivity are related, we start with estimating a simple OLS regression model. In order to exploit the panel structure of the data and to control for correlation between unobserved xed eects and the explanatory variables, we then apply a xed eect regression model. Finally we estimate two specications of a system GMM model to account for dynamic eects and possible endogeneity of explanatory variables resulting from a correlation with past error terms.
To overcome the potential weak instrument problem of the rst dierence GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) , we apply the system GMM estimator implemented by Arellano and Bover (1995) and by Blundell and Bond (1998) . All system GMM models are estimated by using the package provided by Roodman (2009a) . Following Roodman (2009b) , we reduce the number of instruments by using the collapse option. In the rst specication all explanatory variables are treated to be exogenous. In the second specication, both share variables and the export variable are treated as predetermined. Thus, they are assumed to be potentially correlated with past error terms but not with current ones. The lagged dependent variable is endogenous by the nature of the model and is therefore instrumented with own lags starting with lag order two. For all system GMM specications p-values of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions and p-values of a test for second order autocorrelation of the error terms in dierences are reported.
For a rst robustness check the xed eects model and both system GMM specications are estimated without controlling for the inherent selection into the use of xed-term contracts. To take into account dierences between West and East Germany, we apply separate estimations for both groups. This estimations again cover the xed eects model and both system GMM specications.
Estimation results
The analysis starts by calculating the inverse Mills ratio to account for potential self-selection into the use of xed-term contracts. The corresponding estimation results of the probit model are outlined in column one of Table 5 . In accordance with Kleinknecht et al. (2006) , we nd a positive coecient for rm size and a negative one for the share of qualied employees.
[insert Table 5 about here] The actual analysis of the relationship between labor productivity and the share of xed-term employees in total workforce starts with an OLS model in column two, followed by a xed eects model in column three of Table 5 . In both estimates, we nd a positive but insignicant coecient for the Share variable as well as a negative and weakly signicant coecient for the Share2 variable. Hence, the results rather indicate the existence of a weakly negative relationship between labor productivity and the use of xed-term employment than the existence of an inverse U-shaped relationship. Column 4 and 5 contain the estimates of the system GMM approaches. In column 4, all regressors are modeled as exogenous, except the lagged dependent variable, while in the second system GMM model both Share and Share2 variables, as well as export intensity, are assumed to be predetermined. We treat both Share and Share2 variables this way in order to check whether previous results are aected by potential endogeneity. Further, export intensity might also be not strictly exogenous, since it is still debated whether exporting rms are more productive, or if they become more productive by starting to export. In both estimates, however, we nd insignicant coecients for Share and Share2. This implies, rst, that the imposed inverse U-shaped relationship is rejected by both estimations and, second, that the potentially negative but weak relationship, as found in OLS and the xed eect model, also nds no support. In general, the results of our basic models do not support the hypothesis of an inverse U-shaped relationship between the share of xed-term employees on total work force and labor productivity.
Because the expected inverse U-shaped relationship between the use of xedterm employment and labor productivity is not found and some results suggest a weak negative relationship between both, we estimate the same regression models without including the Share2 variable.
[insert Table 6 about here]
In all models the coecient of Share is negative, but not signicant. Thus our results provide no evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationship, nor for a positive or negative relationship. Thus, it follows that the share of employees with xed-term contracts on total work force of an establishment has no signicant impact on labor productivity.
With respect to the remaining control variables, Size is found to have negative and positive parameters, depending on the applied empirical method. In contrast, we nd that when Intermediate is larger there is a positive eect on labor productivity in all estimates. This, however, might only control for the eect that higher turnovers are generated by using more intermediate inputs, which translates into higher productivity here, since labor productivity is dened as sales per capita. Another variable with signicant coecients in all models is Export. Hence, rms with a higher share on turnover abroad have a higher productivity. This remains, even if we model export intensity as predetermined. Moreover, an increasing share of Qualied does also increase the productivity. Only in the xed eect model the respective coecient is not signicant. The coecient of Female is negative and signicant in all models except the xed eects model. Hence, since we nd no eect for Female in the within estimation, the share of female employees on workforce does not have any eect on labor productivity. The signs and magnitude of the coecients of all control variables are not or only barely aected whether Share2 is included or not.
With respect to the selection eect, we nd the expected. The coecient of the inverse Mills ratio is signicant in the OLS and the xed eect approach. Hence, the estimation results are subject to a selection eect. Moreover, the coecients of the inverse Mills ratio in the System GMM approach are not signicant. This is what we expect, since by including the lagged dependent variable in the regression, a part of the distortion resulting from the selection is already captured.
In all system GMM estimations shown in Table 5 and 6, the null hypothesis of the Hansen test of over-identifying can not be rejected at a ve percent level. Also the p-value of the test for autocorrelation is above ve percent. This implies that, in general, the moment conditions are valid and the error terms are not auto correlated. Table 7 contains three robustness checks. In the rst part the results without controlling for possible selection into the use of xed-term employment via inverse Mills ratio are shown. The second and third parts provide separate estimation results for subsamples using only establishments located in West and East Germany. For each robustness check the xed eects model and both system GMM specications are estimated with and without Share2, the squared term of the share variable. In all models only the coecients of Share and Share2 as well as the number of observations and diagnostic statistics are reported. Control variables included in our base line models reported in Table 5 and 6 are also included in all models, but the respective coecients are not reported here. 1 [insert Table 7 about here]
Robustness checks
Ignoring the problem of a potential selection eect leads to the expected inverse U-shaped relationship in the xed eects model. The coecient Share is positive while the coecient of Share2 is negative. Both are signicant at the ve percent level. But, however, in both system GMM models both Share and Share2 have negative, but not signicant, coecients. Therefore, the same models are estimated without including Share2. The respective coecient of Share is negative in all three models, but only signicant in the rst system GMM model, which treats all explanatory variables as exogenous except the lagged dependent variable. It follows that ignoring the selection eect would lead to incorrect conclusions regarding the relationship between productivity and the share of xed-term workers.
Two further robustness checks are carried out by running separate regression models for West and East Germany. For this robustness check, all establishments located in Berlin are excluded because it is not possible to assign them to either West or East Germany. For each subsample, one xed eects specication and two system GMM models are estimated with and without Share2. All models for both subsamples include the inverse Mills ration to control for selection into the use of xed-term employment. The results for the West German subsample are reported in the second part of Table 7 . In the models with both share variables, only the coecient for share in the second system GMM model is signicant at the ten percent level. The respective sign is negative. Excluding Share2 results in insignicant coecients for the Share variable in all models. In the third part of Table 7 the results for the East German subsample are provided. Again no evidence for the expected inverse U-shaped relationship or for a negative relationship is found. Including both share variables, all coecients have the expected sign, but only two coecients of Share2 are signicant. Excluding Share2 leads to insignicant coecients in all models for the East German subsample. So in general the robustness checks conrm our ndings that there is no evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationship between the intensity xed-term contracts are used and labor productivity. Evidence for a negative relationship is also not found.
It follows, that our hypothesis of an inverse U-shaped relationship between the share of employees with a xed-term contract on total work force of an establishment and labor productivity has no support. This result is robust, regardless the estimation method applied or the subsample examined. Moreover, our results also suggest that there is not even a signicant relationship between the use of xed-term employment and labor productivity. However, the analysis has also shown that the selection eect plays a role and ignoring this can potentially lead to false conclusions.
Conclusion
The importance of xed-term contracts in lling vacancies, but also in terms of their share on total workforce, is increasing. The aim of this study is to analyze whether, and if so, to what extent, this development improves the productivity of companies. Put dierently, is it in the companies' interest to use this instrument as intensively as possible because it promises to increases productivity?
In order to address this question, we review previous ndings of labor market and management research. It shows that temporary employment, in general, is used for two reasons: to screen for productive employees and to handle demand uctuations. In this respect, using xed-term contract should positively aect productivity. The literature also suggests the existence of demotivating eects if xed-term workers are used excessively, as well as decreasing rm-specic human capital with an increasing share of xed-term workers. Based on the theoretical considerations and empirical ndings on these eects, we derive the hypothesis of an inverse U-shaped relationship between the share of xed-term workers on total workforce and productivity.
To test this hypothesis, we use a large dataset containing German establishments and apply several panel data models. The inherent selection problem is taken into account via the inverse Mills ratio and the inverse U-shape is modeled by two variables, the share of xed-term workers and its square. Yet, the empirical analysis provides no support for the hypothesis. Rather, we nd mostly negative coecients for both variables modeling the share of xed-term workers on total workforce, with the squared variable being weakly signicant in a few estimations. It is then tested whether the relationship is not inverse U-shaped but negative. Again, no signicant relationship is found, although the coecients are still negative. Hence, our study reveals that there is no signicant relationship between the use of xed-term employment and labor productivity in the German case. This is in line with the ndings of Kleinknecht et al. (2006) for Dutch rms. Since we see mostly negative coecients, although not signicant, it also partly conrms the ndings of Cappellari et al. (2010) for Italy, where the relationship is found to be negative.
Yet, the question arises why there is no relationship found when labor-and management literature point to the negative and positive aspects of this instrument. The reason might be that the majority of xed-term contracts in Germany are longer than one year. Hence, the positive eects of adjusting employment without redundancy costs still exists since a rm can lay o some of the xedterm works every month (if hired a year before), but it would still have to pay some redundancy costs if it tries to terminate all of them in the event of demand slump. In this respect xed-term employment is not as exible as temporary agency work and, thus, the positive eects of increased exibility are limited. But also the negative eect of lower rm specic human capital only partly apply with job tenures of one year, since much of this knowledge is transferred in the rst few months. Moreover, since 50 percent of xed-term workers in Germany are oered a permanent contract the screening and motivational aspects may also have only little eects. Overall the positive and negative aspects, discussed in the labor-and management literature only partly apply to xed-term employment in Germany and, thus, the eects might not be as strong.
However, from a policy perspective, this result remains valid. An increasingly exible labor market in continental European countries, like Germany, is constantly called for. In order to enhance this exibility, the use of instruments like xed-term contracts and temporary agency work was simplied by the government. Although this policy was mainly imposed to reduce unemployment and increase the exibility of the labor market, positive eects for rms were also expected. The ndings of this study show, in line with others, that xed-term contract do not help rms to increase their productivity. From this perspective, therefore, a further expansion of this form of employment seems to be not necessary. (2) 
